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A Trade Policy Goal for the 1990s:
Improving the Adequacy and
Effectiveness of Intellectual Property

Protection in Foreign Countries

David I. Wilson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Safeguarding intellectual property rights (trademarks,' copyrights, 2
patents, 3 trade secrets,4 and semiconductor chip, designs s) from foreign infringers has emerged as one of the most important trade policy
goals of the United States during the 1980s.6 Previously, the U.S.

* Partner, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Southern Illinois University;
J.D. George Washington University. Mr. Wilson wishes to acknowledge the assistance of John
M. Taladay, 1988 Summer Associate, Baker & Hostetler.
1. "A trademark is any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others." Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, USITC Pub. 2065, 1-2, Inv. No. 332-245
(February 1988) [hereinafter Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property].
2. "A copyright is a form of protection provided by a national government to authors
of original works of authorship including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic and certain other
intellectual works." Id. at 1-3.
3. "A patent is a grant issued by a national government conferring the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention within the national territory." Id.
4. "A trade secret is information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known, and not being readily ascertained by proper means,
by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Id. at 1-4.
5. "[Mlask work protection exists for original mask works fixed in a semiconductor chip
product by, or under the authority of the owner of the mask work, which has been registered
or commercially exploited anywhere in the world." Id. at 1-5.
6. GENERAL AccourmnNG OeezcE, Strengthening Worldwide Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, GAO/NSI AD-87-65 (1987) [hereinafter GAO, Intellectual Property Rights].
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government viewed the inadequacy of intellectual property protection
in overseas markets as a technical matter. In recent years, however,
it has become apparent that extensive intellectual property protection
is indispensable for rewarding innovation-perhaps the most signifi-

cant advantage United States companies have over their foreign
competitors. Absent worldwide respect for the protection of intellectual property rights, American companies are unable not only to

obtain the rewards for their inventions-which translate into sales,
profits, and employment-but also to finance research and development for the next generations of their products.
American companies feel the sting of infringement worldwide.

Losses from inadequate intellectual property protection occur in the
country where the infringing products are made, in third countries
to which the products are exported, and in the United States where
infringing products are imported. The U.S. International Trade Com-

mission (ITC) estimated that 6 to 8 billion American dollars in annual
sales were lost in 1984 by United States industry due to foreign
product counterfeiting, passing off, and copyright and patent infringement.7 More recently, the ITC reported that losses for 1986.
have increased to 23.8 billion dollars.8
United States trade policy has focused on two concerns regarding

intellectual property rights: one, protecting American intellectual
property rights in the United States from foreign infringements, and

two, ensuring protection of United States -intellectual property rights

in foreign countries. 9 The United States government has taken an

increasingly active role in seeking improvements in foreign intellectual
property laws. This article focuses on protection of U.S. intellectual
7. The Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, USITC Pub. 1479,
Inv. No. 332-158 (January 1984) [hereinafter Foreign Product Counterfeiting].
8. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 4-I.
9. An important procedure for preventing infringement by foreign entities in the U.S. is
litigation of intellectual property cases before the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
pursuant to Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1983). Section '337
litigation has a number of advantages over litigation in the Federal courts, including: (1) a
statutory deadline of one year in most cases and 18 months in more complicated cases (as
compared to typically lengthy Federal District Court proceedings.) [19 U.S.C. § 1337 (b)(l)
(1983)]; (2) a lack of jurisdictional problems over foreign entities because Section 337 confers
in rem jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction over the imported goods; and (3) a more effective remedy
in most ITC cases than federal district courts-a general exclusion order which directs the
Customs Service to exclude from the U.S. infringing products made by any entity, not just
the entities that were parties in the ITC Proceedings. See T. VAKERICS, D. WIsON, & K.
WEIGEL, ANTIDUmPING, COUNTERVAILING DUtY AND OTHER TRADE AcTIONS, at 485-551 (1987)
[hereinafter VAKERucs, WILSON & WEIGEL]. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 amended § 337 in several respects that will make it a more effective remedy. H.R. REP.
No. 4848, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 258-68 (1988).
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property rights in foreign countries through the use of the trade laws
and through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Specifically, this
analysis addresses:
(1) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974;10
(2) bilateral negotiations between the United States and other countries which have been based, in part, on Section 301 and the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP);11 and
(3) multilateral negotiations for the improvement of foreign intellectual property laws, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) negotiations, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

II.

A.

SECTION 301 AND ITS APPLICATION TO FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION LAWS
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) and Section
301 Procedures

Section 301 provides a means for ensuring that United States
exporters have the opportunity to gain access to foreign markets.,?
Section 301 allows U.S. exporters to overcome barriers that have
been created by foreign governments against imports by filing a
petition with the USTR. 3 Through the petition process, the President
is requested to take action in response to any act, policy, or practice
of a foreign country that is inconsistent with any U.S. trade agree4
ment or unjustifiably burdens United States commerce.
If the USTR finds that actions of a foreign country (or its
instrumentality) requires a response, the USTR is directed to take all
appropriate and feasible action within hiis power to enforce the rights
of U.S. exporters, or to eliminate the policy or practice.' 5 In enforcing

10. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is considered to be a tool for improvement of
foreign intellectual property laws providing authority for the President of the United States to

effect the elimination of unfair trade practices by foreign governments that are harmful to
U.S. commerce. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2411 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988). See infra notes 13,
15, 16 and accompanying text.
11. The GSP grants duty-free treatment to certain imported articles from less developed
countries. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2461-2464 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988). See infra notes 87-94

and accompanying text.
12.
13.
14.
15.

VAKERICS, WILSON & WEIGEL, supra note 9, at 413.
19 U.S.C.S. § 2412 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
19 U.S.C.S. § 2411 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
The Omnibus Trade aid Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Trade Act) requires the

USTR to take action against foreign governments when the foreign government violates a
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the rights of United States exporters the USTR may, among other
things, suspend or withdraw the benefits of trade agreement concessions, or impose duties or other import restrictions on the products
of the foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he deter6
mines appropriate.'
During 1983, Congress conducted hearings to consider amending
Section 301 to explicitly apply to the failure of foreign governments
to provide adequate and effective enforcement of intellectual property
rights. The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means issued a report on the House version of the bill. The report
expressed the Committee's belief that it was "important to address
the growing worldwide problem of intellectual property right protection on a general basis .... 1" The Senate Finance Committee
reported that it had received testimony concerning the adequacy and
effectiveness of the protection of patent holders. The Senate Committee expressed its concern that:
[b]road areas of invention not subject to patent coverage in foreign
countries, such as chemical products; unreasonable forced licensing
and forfeiture provisions for patents; unduly short rights involving
the inability to enjoin infringement; very low or token fines where
infringement is proved, [sic] protracted delay of proceedings with
no interim relief available to the patent holder; and practically
impossible burdens of proof of process infringement placed on
patent holder and the like.' 8

trade agreement or acts in an "unjustifiable" manner, i.e., is inconsistent with U.S. international legal rights and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.
Exceptions to the mandatory action requirement are:
(1) Determinations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade adverse to the
U.S. determinations [See infra, text accompanying notes 137.43]; (2) situations where
the foreign country is taking or agrees to take satisfactory remedial action; (3)
satisfactory compensating benefits have been offered; and (4) action that would

cause serious harm to U.S. national security or have a disproportionate adverse
impact on the U.S. economy. H.R. 484, § 1301, which creates a revised § 301 (a),
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
Lack of protection of intellectual property is an "unreasonable act, but does not require
mandatory action. H.R. 4848, § 1301, which revises § 301(b). 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
16. The USTR is authorized to:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement
concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country ....
(B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of,
such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines
appropriate." H.R. 4848, § 1301, which amends § 301(c). 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
17. H.R. REP'. No. 383, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5048 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 383].
18. S. REP. No. 24, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1983).
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During the Senate hearings, the International Aniti-Counterfditing
Coalition submitted a statement that commercial counterfeiting had
become a prevalent international practice.' 9 The Coalition reported
that commercial counterfeiting not only caused billions of dollars of
losses to trademark and copyright 6ivners, but threateied the health,
safety, and physical well-being of consumers as well. 20
The Trade and Tariff Act of 184 (1984 Trade Act) amended
Section 301 to ensure "that foreign- countries piovide effective minimum safeguards for the acquisitibn and enforcemdnt bf intellectual
property rights and the property value bf proprietary -data."'' 2 The
amendments clarified the authority of the Piesideit to address trade
problems caused by countries that were unwillihg to strengthen' the
protection of intellectual property rights. Specifically, "unjustifiable"
conduct was amended-to include the dfniaI, of "national or mostfavored-nation treatment, the right .of establishment, or protection
of intellectual property rights."2 "Unreasonable" conduct was defined to include,-but not be limited to, "any act, policy, or practice
which denies ... adequate and effective protection of intellectual

property rights."' 3
The 1984 Trade Act also requires the USTR to analyze foreign
policies and practices which constitute significant barriers to the
protection of intellectual property exported or licensed by U.8.
persons. 24 In its annual. report, the USTR must describe the trade
impact of such actions and the -action it has taken with respect to
the trade-distorting practice.4 Thus, Congress has mandated the
identification of inadequacies in foreign intellectual property laws
that adversely affect U.S. companies and to take steps toward eliminating those inadequacies.
The recently enacted Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (1988 Trade Act),26 focuses even greater attention on foreign
intellectual property problems. The 1988 Trade Act provides for the
development of an overall strategy to ensure adequate and effective

19.

Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984: Hearings on S 1718 Before

the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
162-63 (1983) (statement of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition).
20. Id.
21. H.R. REP!. No. 383, supra note 17.
22. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2411(e)(4) (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1988).
23. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2411(e)(3)(C) (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1988).
24. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2241(a)(1) (Law. Co-op & 1983 & Supp. 1988).
25. 19 U.S.C.S § 2241(b)(2) (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1988).
26. H.R. 4848, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
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protection of intellectual property rights, as well as fair and equitable
market access for United States persons that rely on protection of
intellectual property rights. 27 The Act provides that within thirty days
after issuance of the USTR's annual trade estimate report, the USTR
must further identify "priority foreign countries" that deny protection of intellectual property rights. 28 The Act lists three factors to be
used in identifying priority countries: countries exhibiting the most
onerous acts, policies, or practices; countries whose policies or practices have the greatest adverse impact on potential markets for U.S.
products; and countries failing to enter into good faith negotiations
or not making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral nego29
tiations aimed at improving intellectual property protection.
The 1988 Trade Act further requires the USTR to initiate investigations of foreign priority countries unless it is determined that such
an investigation would be ineffective or detrimental to U.S. economic
interests. 30 Moreover, the USTR must determine within nine months
of the initiation of the investigation whether the foreign government
is denying adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights. 3' Although the USTR is not required to take action against
such countries, 32 there is a presumption that the USTR would take
retaliatory action in such cases where there are reasonable indications
that such action will be effective in changing the foreign country's
practice or barrier. 33 In addition, given the interaction between Congress and the Administration on trade policy issues, there will be
considerable pressure for the Administration to take action when the
foreign priority government refuses to provide adequate and effective
intellectual property protection.
Section 301 Proceedings and Korean Protection of Intellectual
Property

B.

Since the 1984 amendments, Section 301 has become an effective
tool for improving foreign intellectual property protection laws. On

27. Id. at 170.
28. Id. at 167. The 1988 Trade Act provides in § 1303 that a new section 182 would be
added to the Trade Act of 1974. Thus, citations to amendments will refer to Section 182.
There are, however, other amendments to existing statutes, as amended. When cited, these
amendments will include both the section of the 1988 Trade Act and the amended statute.
29. Id. at 171.
30. Id. at 143-44.

31.

H.R. 4848, supra note 26, at 149.

32.
33.

Id. at 132-33.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 560 (1988).
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November 4, 1985, the USTR, at the direction of the President,
initiated a Section 301 investigation into the inadequate protection
of United States intellectual property rights by the government of
South Korea. 34 United States government officials had initiated negotiations with South Korean representatives more than two years
earlier35 to discuss problems with Korean patent, trademark, and
unfair competition practices. At that time, the most pressing concern
was denial of product patent protection to United States chemical
companies. Because South Korea's patent law did not cover certain
types of products and, in other cases, limited the type of protection
of patented processes, U:S. chemical companies were greatly af36
fected.
These companies had only recently been granted process patent
protection in South Korea but that protection was easily circumvented
and, therefore, inadequate. The South Korean government responded
that it hoped to introduce legislation to extend product protection
for chemical compounds by 1988. When United States representatives
were informed that such actions could not be expected until the early
37
1990s, consultations broke down.
Patent protection, however, was not the sole concern. The USTR
characterized South Korea's copyright protection as "virtually nonexistent." 38 United States officials delayed negotiations on copyright
issues until November 1984, on the expectation that the new draft
Korean Copyright Act would provide effective protection of copyrights. However, the draft failed to assuage United States concerns
about a lack of protection for foreign works not first published in
South Korea and explicit protection for computer programs. The
Korean Copyright Act also failed to meet the minimum standards of
international copyright conventions.3 9 The draft law was not passed
due to a lack of support in the South Korean legislature. However,
the South Korean government hoped to pacify United States officials

34.

50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1985).

35. In March 1983, a delegation of U.S. officials consulted with Korean officials on
patent and trademark issues. The Korean government stated its intention to enforce penalties
for infringement more stringently and to examine access by foreign companies to the judicial
system. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 35th Report 1983, USITC Pub. 1535,
47-48 (June 1984) [hereinafter OTA 35th Report]. Changes in the Korean copyright law were
then proposed in 1984. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 36th Report 1984,
USITC Pub. 1725, 176 (July 1985) [hereinafter OTA 36th Report].

36. OTA 36th Report, supra note 35.
37. GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 53.
38.
39.

19 U.S.C.S. § 2241(b)(2) (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1988).
GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 53.
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with the promise that a new copyright law would address the concerns
40
of the United States.
Finally, the lack of concrete progress on the part of the South
Korean government and the mounting losses to U.S. intellectual
property owners from the unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted
materials and unauthorized use of U.S. inventions prompted the
USTR to take action under section 301.41 Section 301 allowed the
USTR to pressure South Korean government and industry with the
threat of retaliation. Once this mechanism was activated, extensive
consultations with the South Korean government culminated in a
settlement agreement in August of 1986.42
As a result of the settlement agreement, South Korea agreed to:
- introduce for enactment by July 1, 1987, comprehensive copyright
laws explicitly covering computer software;
accede to the Universal Copyright Convention and Geneva
43
Phonograms Convention by October 1987;
- introduce amendments to its patent laws to extend product patent
protection for chemicals and pharmaceuticals and for new uses of
these products;
adhere to the Budapest Treaty" and extend protection to new
microorganisms; and
- remove requirements for technology inducement and exportation
and to remove restrictions
previously applied to trademarked goods
45
on royalty terms in trademark licenses.
The South Korean government passed revised patent, copyright,
and software legislation in December 1986, effective as of July 1987.
In addition, Korea and the United States agreed to establish a
consultative mechanism implementing the settlement agreement and
other issues relating to the protection of intellectual property. 46 South
Korea also agreed to institute transitional provisions to minimize the
disadvantages to U.S. patents owners and to applicants for Korean

40. Id. South Korean trademark law was also inadequate. It provided minimal protection
of the trademark rights of U.S. companies. "..., Korean firms have been permitted to register
trademarks similar or even identical to foreign trademarks that [werel not 'well known' in
Korea." 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986).
41.
42.

GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 53.
51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986).

43. Universal Copyright Convention and Protocols, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, (as revised 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868).
44. Budapest Microorganisms Treaty (on the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes
of patent procedures), April 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, T.I.A.S. No. 9768, U.K.T.S. 5.
45.
46.

51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986).
Id. at 29,446.
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patents resulting from the limitations of the prior South Korean
47
patent law.
As an enforcement measure, the USTR sought information from
United States companies for the purpose of obtaining relief for U.S.
patent owners under the transitional provisions. Early in 1988, the
USTR requested United States companies with chemical products
patented in the U.S. between January 1, 1980 and July 1, 1987,
which had not been marketed in either South Korea or the U.S.
prior to the effective date of South Korea's new patent law, to submit
information concerning the products and the patent coverage of the
products. These products would be eligible for protection for ten
year. 48 Negotiations are continuing as to which products will receive
the benefit of the transitional rule.
The Section 301 investigation did not solve all problems for U.S.
manufacturers. The American Association of Book Publishers urged
the USTR to reopen the investigation because there were two million
South Korean textbooks in the marketplace which infringed U.S.owned copyrights. Pressure from the United States government resulted in the books being taken off the shelves of bookstores. There
is concern, however, that the books may be trickling back to the
marketplace. Additionally, other industries (including motion pictures
and sporting goods) are concerned about continuing infringement
problems.
Accordingly, representatives from the United States government
and the South Korean government met to discuss the implementation
of the Section 301 settlement agreement. Further meetings are scheduled and it appears that implementation of the agreement will be an
ongoing process.
For example, U.S.-based Bristol-Myers Corporation filed a Section
301 action in November 1987, alleging inadequate and discriminatory
enforcement of intellectual property laws in Korea. 49 Specifically,
Bristol-Myers claimed that, in its attempts to enforce one of its
patents, the South Korean courts revealed a bias against foreign
expert testimony and required that experiments be conducted in South
Korea in order to be admissible in Korean courts. Moreover, BristolMyers alleged that the inability to conduct pretrial discovery and to
obtain preliminary injunctions to curtail potential infringements had

47.

52 Fed. Reg. 3,369 (1987).

48. GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 53.
49. 5 Inside U.S. Trade, at 1-2 (Nov. 27, 1987).
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prevented United States firms from litigating patent infringement
cases in South Korean courts. 50 Bristol-Myers withdrew its petition
to the USTR after receiving assurances from South Korean officials
that the South Korean company (the defendant in the pending BristolMyers case) would begin settlement discussions. 51 The settlement
negotiations ultimately broke down.
Squibb Corporation had similar problems in Korea. It had a joint
venture in South Korea with a Korean pharmaceutical company to
manufacture and distribute Capoten, a drug for high blood pressure
and congestive heart disease. Another South Korean company, Boryung, was granted a patent for a product that Squibb believed was
essentially the same product as Capoten. After Boryung launched its
product in February 1988, Squibb filed a Section 301 petition alleging
a failure of the South Korean Government to respect Squibb's patent
rights, and denial of a product patent protection provided in the
South Korean agreement to provide such protection effective July 1,
1987. Squibb withdrew its petition in May 1988 after it learned that
Boryung wanted to meet in an effort to settle the infringement.5 2
In response to a request from Bristol-Myers, and as a result of
the earlier Section 301 petition by Squibb, the USTR established an
Interagency Fact-Finding Task Force (Task Force). 53 The USTR stated
that the Task Force was created in response to complaints by United
States companies who found that obtaining patent protection in South
Korea was unusually difficult and that, once obtained, did not
provide adequate and effective protection due to lack of proper
4
enforcement.5
The Task Force began an investigation focusing on the treatment
of foreign patent applicants in South Korea, the relative success of
foreign and South Korean patent applications, and the treatment of
foreign patent applications and owners by the South Korean court
system. 55
C.

Brazilian Section 301 Cases

On September 16, 1985, the USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation of Brazilian law and policies that have restricted United

50. Id.
51. 5 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, at 2 (Dec. 18, 1987).
52. IP Asia 6 (Aug. 25, 1988).
53. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 823 (June 15, 1988).
54. The Task Force was directed to make a preliminary report by December 1, 1988. 53
Fed. Reg. 26,706 (1988).
55. Id.
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States trade and investment in the informatics (computer and computer-related) sector 6 and have withheld adequate and effective intellectual property protection for U.S. informatics products.57 The
USTR found that the Brazilian Informatics Law has restricted the
importation of informatics products to Brazil due to a market reserve
policy giving Brazilian companies the exclusive right to manufacture
and sell microcomputers and minicomputers, and further limiting
foreign sales to the more powerful mainframe computers.5 8 The USTR
also found that Brazil prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms
from manufacturing informatics products covered by the market
reserve policy. Finally, Brazil customarily withheld full copyright
protection to computer software, causing great losses due to software
59
piracy.
On December 30, 1986, the President determined that Brazil had
undertaken administrative reforms which, if fully implemented, would
reduce the adverse effect on U.S. commerce caused by the Brazilian
informatics policy 0 However, the President found that insufficient
progress had been made with respect to the protection of intellectual
property rights, particularly computer software and United States
investment in Brazilian informatics. The President directed the USTR
to attempt to negotiate a settlement of the software and investment
issues. 61 Subsequently, on June 30, 1987, the President suspended the
intellectual property portion of the investigation based on progress
in Brazil toward adequate and effective protection for computer
software. 62 However, in September 1987 the Brazilian Secretariat for
Informatics (Brazilian Secretariat or Secretariat) rejected agreements
between Microsoft Corporation, a U.S. company holding copyrights
on the world's leading computer software operating systems for
personal computers, and six Brazilian informatics companies. 63 The
56. For a discussion of the history of Brazil's informatic policy, see OTA 36th Report,
supra note 35, at 184-85.
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985).
58. 51 Fed. Reg. 35,993 (1986); see also -J. Commerce, July 27, 1988, at 4B, col. 4. It
has been reported that the market reserve policy has resulted in Brazil's producing expensive
and obsolete clones of foreign computers and a growing black market of an estimated S300
million of computers and computer parts per year. Id.
59. 51 Fed. Reg. 35,993-94 (1986).
60. 52 Fed. Reg. 1,619 (1987).
61. Id.
62. 52 Fed. Reg. 24,971 (1987).
63. The Brazilian Government authorized the licensing of Microsoft Corp.'s older MSDOS 3.3 computer operating system, the most sophisticated version of its operating programs
for personal computers. It continued, however, to deny approval to its MS-DOS 3.2 system.
In addition, the Brazilian Government refused to license a Brazilian-made computer that Apple
Computer, Inc. alleged was a copy of its Macintosh computer. J. Commerce, July 27, 1988,
at 4B, col. 4.
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Brazilian Secretariat's decision was based on a finding that a Brazilian-made "functional equivalent" to the software existed for use by
Brazilian companies and that the market reserve policy precluded
import of the Microsoft operating system. 4
The USTR interpreted the Brazilian Secretariat's decision as a
violation of the understanding that "functional equivalent" determinations would be objective decisions. According to the USTR, the
Secretariat's decision established a precedent that effectively bans
United States companies from the Brazilian software market. Except
for mainframe and similar computers, U.S. computers are already
prohibited from participating in the Brazilian hardware market. 65 In
response to the Brazilian Secretariat's action, the USTR considered
restricting the importation of Brazilian products having a value equal
to the lost sales opportunities caused by Brazil's policy. Accordingly,
the USTR published a list of products that would be subject to
retaliation. 66 As this retaliation was about to take effect, the Brazilian
President, President Sarney, exercised his line-item veto authority to
veto a provision of a bill that would have imposed high taxes on
67
imported software.
In response to the above changes, the USTR suspended the Section
301 action pending a review of the Brazilian regulations implementing
the new software law.6 s ADAPSO, 69 the United States computer
software and service trade association, requested that the USTR
reopen the investigation because the regulations permitted the Brazilian Secretariat to limit U.S. software companies from marketing
in Brazil. ADAPSO was particularly concerned with the fact that the
regulations left wide discretion for subjective, rather than objective,
decisions on market access issues. 70 The USTR recently stated that it
would postpone its decision on whether to retaliate against Brazil
until there was a more complete record on the implementation of
the new law. However, the USTR expressed disappointment with the

64. 52 Fed. Reg. 44,939 (1987).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 5 INsIDE U.S. TRADE at 3-4 (Dec. 31, 1987).
68. Citing Progress in Brazil's Software Policy, Administration Puts Import sanctions on
Hold, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 277 (March 2, 1988).
69. The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations. ADAPSO is headquartered
in Arlington, Virginia, USA.
70. ADAPSO Calls on Administration to Reopen Probe of Brazilian Restrictions on
Software, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 788 (June 1, 1988).
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lack of clarity in the new law. 7' Moreover, the USTR noted it was
opposed in principle to a "functional equivalencies" concept, which

permitted the Brazilian governmentto prohibit the importation of a
product if a similar product were available from a Brazilian source.7 2
The USTR's proposed retaliation would not be limited to Brazilian
exports of products similar to the U.S. products giving rise to the
dispute. 73 For example, Embraer, a Brazilian manufacturer of com-

muter aircraft, had not been able to enter into any contracts for the
sale of aircraft while the proposed retaliation was pending.7 4 When

the proposal was repealed, Embraer obtained a contract to sell six
airplanes to Air West, a U.S. airline.75 Moreover, Embraer was
subsequently allowed to cancel letters of credit that had been required
by U.S. airlines as a guarantee that the purchase prices for ordered
if United States retaliatory measures were
airplanes would not change
76
retroactively.
applied
Another Section 301 investigation involving Brazil was initiated on
July 23, 1987, in response to a petition filed by the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA). 7 The petition alleged that Brazil
had failed to provide both process and product patent protection to
pharmaceutical products. In initiating the request for retaliation to
the President, the USTR noted that it had previously consulted with
Brazil on these issues.78 During hearings on the case, an official of

71. Administration Response on Drug Industry Complaint Against Brazil is Expected
Soon, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1976 (July 6, 1988).
72. GATT Reform Alone Won't Bring U.S. Farmers Back the Competitive Lead, USTR
Yeutter Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 977-78 (July 6, 1988).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (1987). The pending Brazilian pharmaceutical case is one of
several cases being pursued"by the PMA regarding the inadequate patent protection provided
by South American countries which include Argentina, Chile and Mexico. PMA asked the
USTR to initiate an investigation against Argentina, alleging that Argentina caused U.S.
pharmaceutical companies to lose at least $83 million in 1987. J. Commerce, August 3, 1988,
at 3A, col. S. PMA threatened to file an action against Chile after it dropped an earlier case
due to the agreement of the Chilean Government to provide full patent protiction for products
developed by U.S. coinpanies. However, lack of progress led to a breakdown in negotiations
between Chile and the United States. 6 INsm U.S. TRADE, at 14 (July 1, 1988). Finally, the
U.S. has consulted with Mexico concerning its pharmaceutical regulations which allegedly
ended the patent and trademark protection of U.S. companies operating in Mexico. Operation
of the Trade Agreements Program, 37th Report 1985, USITC Pub. 1871, at 185-86 (June
1986) [hereinafter OTA 37th Report].
78. 52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (1987). Brazil amended its patent laws in 1969 to permit Brazilian
companies to use pharmaceutical inventions without paying of royalties. USTR Panel Hears
Testimony on Section 301 Investigationof Brazilian Pharmaceuticals,4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1146 (Sept. 23, 1987).
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Lederle International, Inc., testified that Lederle had closed its Bra-

zilian pharmaceutical plant because of the lack of patent protection. 79
On July 21, 1988, President Reagan ordered 200 million American
dollars in trade sanctions against Brazil for failure to provide patent
protection to United States pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturers.80

In response, the Brazilian Foreign Relations Ministry stated that
Brazil's willingness to propose process patent protection showed its
willingness to negotiate. However, it also said that it was considering
filing a complaint with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

President Sarney of Brazil stated that the U.S.-proposed action
constituted a "violation of basic principles of international law and
GATT rules." 8'

D.

Foreign Protection Under Other United States Legislation
1. The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 2 enacted
by the United States in 1983, extended duty-free treatment to most
imports from designated countries in the Caribbean Basin. Under
CBERA, the President designates the countries which are to receive

CBERA benefits. Certain U.S. companies were concerned with the
unauthorized interception of satellite transmissions of copyrighted
materials by some Caribbean governments. 3 The companies responded by persuading Congress to enact a CBERA amendment
which prohibited the President from designating any country that
engaged in the broadcast of U.S. copyrighted material without the

79. Another PMA member, Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, testified that the Brazilian
policy had cost it $34.6 million in lost sales of an ulcer product (TAGAMET). USTR Panel
Hears Testimony on Section 301 Investigation of BrazilianPharmaceuticals,4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1146-47 (Sept. 23, 1987).
80. 53 Fed. Reg. 28,100 (1988). A White House spokesman said:
Adequate patent protection is the cornerstone of a healthy pharmaceutical industry .... By denying this basic commercial right, Brazil permits unauthorized copying
of pharmaceutical products and processes that were invented by U.S. firms. This
not only deprives American companies of sales, it discourages investment in the
research and development of new drugs.
Washington Post, July 20, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
81. Administration Plans Hearingson Sanctions Against Brazilian PharmaceuticalPatent
Case, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1056-57 (July 27, 1988).
82. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & Supp. IV 1986).
83. H.R. Rp. No. 266, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMFn. NEws 643, 650.
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consent of the owner.8 4 Also, under CBERA, one of the eleven
discretionary criteria 5 to be considered by the President in designating
a beneficiary country is the extent to which the country protects

intellectual property rights of foreign nationals. 6
2.

The Generalized System of Preferences

In 1983, the United States House of Representatives Ways and
Means Committee conducted hearings on the renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The GSP grants duty-free treatment to articles entering the U.S. from developing countries. The
hearings produced testimony from many U.S. companies regarding
the inadequacies of the intellectual property laws in GSP recipient
countries. The House Ways and Means Committee reacted to the

infringement problem by reporting that it was "extremely concerned
about the growing problem of counterfeiting which is costing Amer-

ican jobs, threatening the health and safety of consumers, and

84. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
85. The eleven factors to be considered by the President in designating any country as a
"beneficiary country" are:
(1)an expression by such country of its desire to be so designated;
(2) the economic conditions in such a country, the living standards of its inhabitants,
and any other economic factors which he deems appropriate;
(3) the extent to which such country has assured the United States it will provide
equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity resources of
such country;
(4) the degree to which such country follows the accepted rules of international trade
provided for under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as applicable
trade agreements approved under section 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
[19 USCS § 2503(a)];
(5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or imposes export
performance requirements or local content requirements which distort international
trade;
(6) the degree to which the trade policies of such country as they relate to other
beneficiary counties are contributing to the revitalization of the region;
(7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help measures to promote
its own economic development;
(8) the degree to which workers in such country are afforded reasonable workplace
conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(9) the extent to which such country provides under its law adequate and effective
means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise, and enforce exclusive rights in
intellectual property, including patent, trademark,, and copyright rights;
(10) the extent to which such country prohibits its nationals from engaging in the
broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or television material, belonging
to United States copyright .owners without their express consent; and
(11) the extent to which such country is prepared to cooperate with the United States
in the administration of the provisions of this title.
19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(1)-(I 1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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undermining the ability of American businesses to compete in world
markets. '3 7 Similarly, the Senate Finance Committee collected extensive testimony on the practice of counterfeiting and other forms of
unfair competition in U.S. and world markets from foreign-made
products made or imported in violation of intellectual property
rights. 8 The Senate Report cited the 1984 ITC Report as authority
for the proposition that countries in East Asia were the most prevalent
source of counterfeiting and piracy. 9
Congress recognized the infringement problem by removing the
GSP from the 1984 Trade Act, thereby requiring that the President
consider intellectual property issues in determining a country's eligibility for GSP benefits 0 Specifically, the President must evaluate
the extent to which the country is providing adequate and effective
means under its laws for foreign nationals to exercise exclusive
intellectual rights. 9' The 1984 Trade Act also provides that countries
can lose their eligibility for GSP treatment regarding specific products
if their exports exceed certain competitive need limits. 92 However,
the President can waive the competitive need limits based on advice
from the ITC regarding the impact of the waiver on U.S. industry.
This advice is to be based, in part, on the extent to which the
country provides adequate and effective means for foreign nationals
to exercise intellectual property rights. 93 Thus, the amendments to
the 1984 Trade Act have created an incentive for developing countries
to improve their intellectual property laws.
In implementing the 1984 Trade Act, the USTR has consulted with
the major GSP beneficiary countries as well as many of the smaller
GSP recipients. During the consultations, the USTR has emphasized
the importance of GSP beneficiaries improving their intellectual
property systems. According to the USTR, bilateral negotiations
between the U.S. and GSP countries have been helpful in obtaining
improvements in the intellectual property laws of Taiwan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Malaysia. On the other hand, a lack of progress
led to reductions in GSP benefits to such countries as Brazil and
Mexico. 94

87. H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
88. S. REP. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984).
89. Id.
90. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
91. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462 (c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
92. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2464(c) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
93. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2464 (c)(3)(B) (i) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
94. GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6; see also 5 INsIDE U.S.

TRADE at
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III. BLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Since the early 1980s, the USTR has engaged in bilateral trade
negotiations with Asian countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
as well as Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Brazil.
Many United States companies have become involved in the negotiations by providing information to the USTR about countries with
intellectual property problems and participating in consultations with
the countries as part of the U.S. delegation.
In 1984, the International Trade Administration of the Department
of Commerce, in conjunction with the Patent and Trademark Office,
identified those countries causing the most significant problems for
United States firmsY5 The strongest focus has been on South Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan in Asia; and Brazil and Mexico, in the
Americas. In addition, the U.S. has encouraged developing countries,
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, to adopt effective intellectual property laws before counterfeiting becomes significant in
their countries.9 Also, there have been bilateral negotiations with
developed countries, such as Canada and Japan. The next section
will focus on the primary countries that have been affected by
bilateral negotiations.
Negotiations with Individual Countries

A.

1. Canada
The U.S. and Canada had consulted for several years regarding
the provision of the Canadian patent law which allows the granting
of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical patents and the payment
of an artificially low royalty of four percent. Because most Canadian

1-2 (Nov. 27, 1987). It was reported that Mexico lost -more than $5 million in GSP benefits
because it refused to change its process patent laws in accordance with the timetable proposed
by the United States. Administration, Congress Can Work Together on Bill to Protect U.S.
Rights, Official Says, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 79-80 (Jan. 21, 1987) (statement of Harvey
D. Bale, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy).

The removal of Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore from duty-free treatment
under GSP because of their competitiveness eliminates the use GSP lever with these countries.

President Reagan Removes Four Pacific Rim Countries From GSP for Economic Reasons; 5
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 132 (Feb. 3, 1988).

95. The countries identified as causing the most significant problems were Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. GAO

Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6.

96.

Id. at 40-45.
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pharmaceutical patent owners are U.S. companies, the U.S. was
concerned about the compulsory licensing law. In 1983, the Canadian
government stated that it would change the law. 97 After delays caused
by a change in the Canadian government and a stormy passage
through Parliament, Bill C-22 98 was passed and given Royal Assent.
The new patent law grants improved protection to owners of drug
product patents or process patents. Under the Canadian law, these
patent owners are exempt from the compulsory licensing statute for:
(a) ten years against importation of the patented medicine or the
medicine made by the process patent for sale for consumption in
Canada; and
(b) seven years against manufacture of the patented medicine or the
medicine made by the process patent for consumption in Canada."
Depending on the dates of issue of any compulsory license or
Notice of Compliance (NOC), Canadian law grants a more limited
exemption against importation than it does for manufacturing of
medicines if the first NOC was issued prior to June 27, 1986. There
are no exemptions which would prohibit importation into Canada
for subsequent exportation, except for medicines invented and developed in Canada. The bill also creates a Patent Medicine Price
Review Board and empowers it to obtain information on costs and
prices from patentees in order to monitor pharmaceutical prices.
2. Indonesia
Indonesia's intellectual property protection system is reported to
be minimal and enforcement of existing laws inadequate. However,
there have been some recent hopeful signs. Following President
Reagan's visit to Indonesia in May 1986, Indonesia's President established a commission to examine intellectual property questions. A
new copyright law was enacted and a draft patent law is under
consideration. 100

97. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 38th Report 1986, USITC Pub. 1995,
at 4-20 (July 1987) (hereinafter OTA 38th Report].
98. CANAntx BILL No. C-22, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for
Certain Matters in Relation Thereto Ch. 41, (1987), 10 CAN. GAZ. Part III, 1175-1210 (No.
6, Jan. 26, 1988).
99. Bill C-22. The seven and ten year periods are measured from the date of issue (by
the Canadian Government's Health Protection Branch) of the first notice of compliance
permitting sale of the medicine in Canada, and not from the date of the issuance of the
patent.
100. Address of Donald J. Quigg, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, before the
American Bar Association (August 25, 1988), 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 442
(1988) [hereinafter Quigg Address].

1988 / A Trade Policy Goal for the 1990s

3.

Japan

In 1983, legislation was being considered by the Japanese government which would have eliminated copyright protection for computer
software.' 01 Instead, software would have been protected by a sui
generis law that would have reduced the term of protection from a
50 year term to two 15 year terms.'0 2 More significantly, from the
standpoint of the U.S. computer software industry, the law would
have required compulsory licensing of software. Strong international
opposition, as well as internal opposition in Japan, led to the
abandonment of the proposal.103
A current dispute concerning Japan is whether its patent system
has a discriminatory effect against United States and other foreign
applicants for Japanese patents. The specific complaints include: (a)
inadequate separation between the Japanese Patent Office and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry; (b) inadequate protection of trade secrets; (c) long delays in obtaining patents; and (d)
publication of applications after 18 months with a resultant "flooding" of applications with similar claims.0 4 A U.S.-Japanese working
group was established to consider steps to resolve significant differences between the U.S. and Japanese patent systems. 05 In a recent
conference between the United States and Japan, several specific
aspects of each country's patent laws were the target of negotiations. 106

101. OTA 35th Report, supra note 35, at 269.
102. OTA 36th Report, supra note 35, at 147.
103. Id.
104. 134 CONG. REc. S9909 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
105. Quigg Address, supra note 100.
106. Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1988, at 8, cols. 5-6. The United States demanded that Japan
should:
(1) adopt a longer grace period for an inventor to file for a patent after he discloses
his invention;
(2) be more flexible with foreign language applications;
(3) liberalize rules for amending applications to widen protection from frivolous
challengers, and
(4) adopt U.S.-style techniques for gathering facts in patent litigation to provide
quicker court relief.
The Japanese counter that their six month grace period is already longer than the European
grace period and that its existing provisions for amendments are broader than in the U.S. The
Japanese also complain that the new U.S. trade law provides too short a time for the U.S.
International Trade Commission to reach a tentative decision on complaints of foreign violations
of U.S. patents. Id.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 1

4. Mexico
The United States has been negotiating with Mexico regarding the
limited protection provided by Mexican patent laws.' 0 7 Mexico's 1976
Law on Inventions and Trademarks (the Law) provides for ten-year,
nonrenewable protection for patented goods. However, the Law
denies patent protection to pharmaceuticals, chemicals, foods, beverages, metal alloys, nuclear devices, pollution control devices, and
plant and animal varieties. In response to U.S. pressure, a bill was
proposed to extend patent protection. Pharmaceuticals, agricultural
chemicals, and biotechnical processes and alloys, however, would
remain unpatentable. 08
The U.S. entered into a U.S.-Mexican bilateral commercial framework agreement on November 6, 1987.'0 9 The agreement creates a
consultative mechanism for resolving disputes between the countries
on trade and investment matters. Among the topics listed as subject
to bilateral negotiations are those involving technology transfer and
intellectual property."10
5.

Singapore

A U.S. joint government/industry delegation visited Singapore in
1984 and initiated discussions on the need to protect copyrights since
Singapore's copyright law offered little protection to foreign companies. Singapore was known at that time as the tape piracy capital
of the world"' with an estimated production of seventy million
counterfeit tapes per year. In August 1985, a U.S. delegation returned
to Singapore to review a draft copyright law" 2 to suggest improvements to the draft law. The Singapore Parliament passed the law in
February 1987. In connection with the GSP annual review procedure,
Singapore assured the United States that U.S. companies holding

107. US and Mexico Sign BilateralFramework on Trade, Investment, Dispute Resolution,
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.44, at 1378 (Nov. 11, 1987).
108. OTA 38th Report, supra note 97, at 4-37.
109. U.S.-Mexico BilateralFramework Agreement on Trade and Investment, 4 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1410-11 (Nov. 11, 1987).
110. Id. at 1411.
111.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OVERSIGHT ON INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTS: HEAR-

INGS BEFORE THE SUBCOM.

ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS,

Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
112. GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 52.

440

S. HRG. 1183, 98th
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new copyrights would be protected by a bilateral agreement with the
United States." 3
6.

Taiwan

Counterfeiting has been a major bilateral issue for the United
States and Taiwan since at least the early 1980s.1 4 In 1982, an
anticounterfeiting committee was established in Taiwan to collect
information on counterfeiting and to facilitate counterfeiting investigations. This led to an amendment" 5 of the trademark law in
January 1983, which provided for more severe penalties, more effective enforcement, and greater protection for foreign trademark holders."16

The first formal consultation between the U.S. and Taiwan regarding intellectual property and unfair competition issues occurred
in March 1983. Representatives of United States companies were part
of a delegation to Taiwan. The delegation raised individual problems
that they were experiencing. The pressure from the U.S. and other
governments, combined with widespread publicity of Taiwan as a
7
major source of counterfeit goods, led to some changes in 1984.1
Consultations on intellectual property continued in 1984. Working
groups on patent protection for chemicals, copyright issues, and
unfair trade practices were established. In 1984, the Taiwanese government established another anticounterfeiting committee to investigate trademark counterfeiting, while the private sector organized a
National Anticounterfeiting Committee to increase public awareness
about the need to combat counterfeiting.'"
In July 1985, Taiwan passed a copyright law that not only increased
penalties on copyright infringement, but also extended protection to
computer software." 9 Taiwan also extended patent protection to

113. Id.
114. OTA 35th Report, supra note 35, at 45-6, 316-7.
115. Id. at 46.
116. For example, foreign owners whose famous trademarks (.e, worldwide, well-known
trademarks) are registered in a country with which Taiwan has a reciprocal arrangement, may

bring criminal actions in Taiwan even though their trademarks are not formally registered in
Taiwan. Special courts were created to handle trademark and patent cases. Also, a prosecutor's
seminar on criminal investigations highlighted the importance of addressing counterfeiting
problems and to allow prosecutors to exchange views on trademark and patent cases. Foreign
Product Counterfeiting, supra note 7, at 46-47.
117. In 1984 Taiwan was identified by the ITC as the world's largest single source of
counterfeit goods. rd. at xiv.
118. OTA 37th Report, supra note 77, at .192.
119. GAO, Intellectual Properly Rights, supra note 6, at 51.
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foreign chemical and pharmaceutical products. Another important
development occurred in November 1985, when Taiwan dropped the
requirement that foreigners must register their trademarks in order
20
to file suit while Taiwanese nationals did not need to do so.
Further progress in protecting intellectual property occurred in
1986. Copyright and trademark laws were revised to provide increased
penalties for infringement. Foreign firms were given greater access
to Taiwanese. courts. Also, amendments to patent laws and the
establishment of an unfair competition law were proposed.'2,
7.

Thailand

There have been bilateral negotiations with Thailand. Legislation
has been drafted that would provide improved protection for trademarks. However, legislation to protect copyrights has not been enacted due to severe political. problems. Also, extensive discussions
concerning the protection of pharmaceuticals resulted from the filing
of a petition to withdraw GSP benefits filed by the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association. '2
B.

The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 198423

The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (Chip Act), 24 protects the
design of computer chips by providing exclusive rights for ten years
for the mask works from which the chips are made.'2 The Chip Act
is an unusual example of how the enactment of a law providing
protection to a new form of intellectual property in the United States
led to similar statutes being enacted in other countries. The U.S. was
the first country to enact a statute specifically protecting mask works.
Congress was concerned that foreign companies lacking protection
for chip designs in their own countries would be protected under the
U.S. Chip Act, but that U.S. chip companies would be unable to
get reciprocal protection in the foreign countries. Consequently,

120. OTA 37th Report, supra note 77, at 192.
121. OTA 38th Report, supra note 97, at 4.40. To date, the proposals remain under
consideration.
122. Quigg Address, supra note 100.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 901-914 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988). For a comprehensive analysis
of the Chip Act, see D. Wilson and . LaBarre, The Semiconductor Protection Act of 1984:
A PreliminaryAnalysis, 67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 57 (1985).
124. Id.
125. Mask works are defined as a series of related images, however fixed or encoded, that
represent the three-dimensional pattern in the layers of a semiconductor chip. 17 U.S.C.S. §
901(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988).
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Congress included unique provisions in the Chip Act to foster international development of chip protection. Section 902 of the Chip
Act provides that foreign mask works may become eligible for
protection in the U.S. under three conditions: (1) if the mask work
is first commercially exploited in the U.S.; (2) if the foreign company
manufacturing the mask work is located in a country that is a party
to a treaty which protects mask works and the U.S. is also a party;
and (3) the foreign work is encompassed by a Presidential procla,26
mation.
The Chip Act also provides that foreign nationals may obtain
interim protection if their countries are making good faith efforts
and reasonable progress toward reciprocal protection of mask works
owned by U.S. nationals.' 27 Section 914 also grants the Secretary of
Commerce authority to grant coverage to foreign nationals if progress
is being made toward reciprocal treatment and the foreign nationals
are not engaging in misappropriation of U.S. mask works.'2 Thus,
the Chip Act includes provisions that are, in effect, a cross-weave
of protections and a platform for bilateral negotiations.
In 1985, interim protection was granted to nationals of Australia,
Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the member states of the European Community. The interim protection was granted either on the basis of plans to enact legislation
(e.g., members of the European Community, Japan, and Sweden),
or on the basis of representations that their existing copyright laws
12 9
cover chip designs (e.g., Australia and the United Kingdom).
Pursuant to Section 914 of the Chip Act, the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office (Commissioner), in consultation with
the Register of Copyrights,' 0 recommended to Congress in November
1986, that the authority to grant interim protection should be extended for three years. The recommendation was made in anticipation
that elections might delay some European countries from enacting
chip laws by November 8, 1987, the original expiration date. Based
126.

17 U.S.C.S. § 902(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988). The President may issue

such a proclamation upon a finding that the foreign government extends protection to U.S.
companies on substantially the same basis as ii provides protection to its own nationals. 17
U.S.C.S. § 902(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988). The Copyright Office recently issued
a final rule on the procedures it will follow for evaluation of requests by foreign governments
for the issuance of Presidential proclamations granting protection in the U.S. to mask works
of foreign origin. 53 Fed. Reg. 24,444 (1988).
127. 17 U.S.C.S. § 914(a) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988).
128. 17 U.S.C.S. § 914(a) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988).
129. 53 Fed. Reg. 16,308-11 (1988).
130. 17 U.S.C.S. § 914(f)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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on that recommendation, Congress extended the authority of the
Secretary of Commerce to provide interim protection until July 1,
1991.'13 The purpose of the extension was to provide a continued
incentive for foreign nations to move expeditiously to enact chip
protection legislation, and to lay a sound basis for the development
of a new multilateral treaty under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)32 or another appropriate or33
ganization.
Interim protection was extended under the new statute because
substantial progress had been made in all countries that had been
subject to interim protection orders. In fact, seven countries had
enacted statutes providing for the protection of U.S. chip designs to
the same degree as their domestic chip designs. The remaining countries were found to be making good faith efforts toward the enactment of legislation and were also actively supporting the work of
WIPO in developing a new multilateral agreement which would
establish international protection for chip designs. 34 Thus, the Chip
Act has achieved its objective of encouraging foreign governments
to enact protective legislation, and to work toward a treaty which
would protect chip designs.
C.

General Agreement on Tariff and Trade

The United States is also attempting to improve intellectual property protection by utilizing the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT), 35 a multilateral agreement which sets general rules
of conduct for trade between contracting parties. Under the auspices
of GATT, there have been seven rounds of negotiations which have
resulted in a major reduction of tariff rates. During the 1979 Tokyo
round of negotiations, the United States, with assistance from other
developed countries, prepared a draft of an anticounterfeiting code
designed to discourage the sale of counterfeit products. While the
draft was never officially submitted for consideration, work continued
on the Code. Pursuant to the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, GATT
continued to explore the propriety of GATT action to combat coun-

131. Pub. L. No. 100-159, § 2, 101 Stat. 899 (Nov. 8, 1987).
132. For discussion of WIPO, see infra the text accompanying notes 137-143.
133. H.R. REp. No. 388, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 304 (1987).
134. 53 Fed. Reg. 16,308, 16,311 (1988).
135. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (1948).
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terfeit goods. During 1985, a group of experts from the contracting
parties discussed the Code and considered the possibility of broadening later GATT discussions to include infringement of other intellectual property rights. An Administration official stated that an
agreement in principle had been reached with other developed countries. Implementation of the Code, however, was prevented by the
136
resistance of developing countries.
The Ministerial Declaration of the eighth round (the 1986 Uruguay
Round) stated the following objectives concerning intellectual property issues:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure
that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT Provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles,, rules, and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in
the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property
37
Organization and elsewhere to deal.with these matters.
The U.S. hopes to convince other contracting parties that GATT
codes are necessary because existing treaties have proven inadequate
to prevent counterfeiting and piracy, and that there is presently no
enforcement mechanism or dispute settlement provision. While the
U.S. and other industrialized countries have favored having intellectual property issues encompassed by GATT, some developing countries have opposed that approach. Instead, they favor dealing with
intellectual property issues in the WIPO, a specialized agency of the
United Nations which administers the major intellectual property
treaties. In recent years, however, some developing countries have
opposed efforts within WIPO to strengthen international intellectual
property standards. Instead, these countries have attempted to weaken
1 3
existing standards. 1

136.
137.
Trade,
138.

GAO, Intellectual PropertyRights, supra note 6, at 35-38.
GATT Launches Uruguay'Round as Consensus Reached on Services, Agricultural
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1150 (Sept. 24, 1986).
GAO, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 6, at 25.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 1
On October 28, 1987, the United States extended a framework
proposal on intellectual property to GATT signatories. The framework would require GATT signatories to enact intellectual property
laws that meet agreed-upon standards. The suggested norms are: (1)
patent availability for all new inventions with exclusive rights for
twenty years from the date that patent protection is sought; (2)
registrability of trademarks and enforced protection of registered
trademarks; (3) copyright protection for all forms of creative expression, including newer forms such as computer programs, and
data bases for the life of the author plus 50 years; and (4) trade
secrets provisions broadly defined to include undisclosed valuable
business, commercial, technical, or other proprietary nature, with
GATT signatories agreeing not to disclose technical secrets submitted
to government officials as a requirement to do business; and (5)
39
protecti6n for the original layout design of semiconductor chips.
To implement the above norms, the U.S. proposed consultative
and dispute settlement mechanisms and enforcement measures to be
enacted in the signatory countries. The EEC and Japan also offered
intellectual property proposals for consideration in the Uruguay
Round. Thus, these three major entities recognized that intellectual
property plays a key role in world trade. 40 In contrast, third world
countries have argued that WIPO, rather than GATT, should be the
forum for discussion on intellectual property issues.' 4' In fact, developing countries reportedly contend that the United States proposals
go beyond the mandate of the negotiating group. 4 2 They argue that
the declaration which began the Uruguay Round allows only nego43
tiations on preventing trade in counterfeit goods.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States has taken an increasingly active and creative
role in improving intellectual property rights in foreign countries.
The 1988 Trade Act continues the pattern of pursuing bilateral and
multilateral means to improve foreign intellectual property laws.
While the United States program has a certain momentum, it is far

139. E.C. PresentsDetailed Proposalfor GATT Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, 1012 (July 13, 1988).
140. Cutting Brazilfrom GSP Wouldn't Jeopardize U.S. Leverage on Informatics, Yeutter
Says, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, 1427 (Nov. 4, 1987).
141. Id.
142. 5 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 16 (July 29, 1988).
143. 5 INSiDE U.S. TRADE 1 (July 22, 1988) (Special Report).
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from clear that it will continue to be successful. Brazil's recent threat
to obtain redress through GATT for U.S.-threatened retaliation may
represent a serious challenge to the United States. Moreover, the
most serious intellectual property problems in some countries involve
enforcement issues; for example, in South Korea, enforcement issues
rather than the adequacy of the protection of intellectual property
may be more difficult to resolve. Similarly, there is strong resistance
from some less developed countries to adopting the GATT approach
to dealing with intellectual property issues. Thus, continued progress
toward improving the adequacy and effectiveness of foreign intellectual property laws will require sustained effort by the United States.
The 1988 Trade Act requirement that the USTR take a systematic
approach towards evaluating and influencing foreign intellectual
property laws may prove to be a good mechanism for keeping United
States policy on a steady course.

